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LAW REVIEW
VOL. V MAY, 1931 No. 2
SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW
T HE administration of justice has ever been a target;
sometimes for the philosopher, sometimes for the fool;
now for the righteous, then for the criminal; occasionally
for the lawyer, less frequently for the jurists; but always
a target, forever subject to the "slings and arrows" of out-
raged suppliants at the temple of justice. Wherein lies the
cause of this unending dissatisfaction? Is the ideal of ab-
stract justice so fantastic and extravagant that it defies
realization in the concrete? Is the economic and social flux
so meteoric, that justice ever loath to forsake a principle
once established lags sheepishly behind, or is it that juristic
thinking needs a complete overhauling of the "fundamen-
tals," as they are affectionately called? 1
'Ehrlich, Grundlegung Der Soziologie Des Rechts (1913), c. 1, p. 16:
"For one, however, who sees in law primarily a rule of conduct, the coercion
involved in punishment as well as that in the execution of judgments neces-
sarily falls into the background. For him, human life is not enacted before
courts. A moment's observation teaches him that every man stands in count-
less relationships and that with very few exceptions he does quite of his own
accord what is obligatory upon him in these relationships; he fulfills his
duties as father and son, as husband or wife, he refrains from disturbing
his neighbor in the latter's enjoyment of his property, he pays his debts, de-
livers what he has sold, performs that for which he has bound himself to
his employer. The jurist always has the remark ready that men do their
duty only because they know that in any case they could be forced to do it
by the dourts. But if he would only take the unfamiliar trouble of observing
men in their activities he would easily convince himself that for the most part
they do not think at all of the coercion of courts. So far as they do not do
what is naturally according to the rule of the situation, they give quite dif-
ferent reasons for their decision: they might, if they acted differently, fall
out with their dependents, lose their positions and trade, and get the reputation
of a quarrelsome, dishonorable, unreliable man. But this fact, at least, even
the jurist ought not to have ignored, namely that what men do as their legal
duties in this sense of the word is often something quite different from, and
sometimes something much more than, what they can be compelled by the
authorities to do. Not infrequently the rule of conduct is entirely distinct
from the enforceable rule."
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The words of Thrasymachus on the subject of justice,
written some 25 centuries ago are significant:
"Listen, then-I proclaim that might is right,
and justice is the interest of the stronger * * *. The
different forms of government make laws-demo-
cratic, aristocratic, or autocratic, with a view to their
respective interests; and these laws, so made by them
to serve their interests, they deliver to their subjects
as 'justice,' and punish as 'unjust' anyone who trans-
gresses them. I am speaking of injustice on a large
scale; and my meaning will be most clearly seen in
autocracy, which by fraud and force takes away the
property of others, not retail but wholesale. Now
when a man has taken away the money of the citi-
zens and made slaves of them, then, instead of
swindler and thief he is called happy and blessed by
all. For injustice is censured because those who
censure it are afraid of suffering, and not from any
scruple they might have of doing injustice them-
selves." 2
Plato's famous classic, "The Republic," was an attempt,
among other things to plan a system for the perfection of
applied justice. The "good life" he argued must come from
a fusion of will and reason, fostered by a social unit called
the state. The state in turn would promote justice by legis-
lation of the most sweeping character, and the promotion of
such concepts as the following: the belief in a personal God,
the selection of leaders by intelligent elimination after all
have had opportunities of education, a system of eugenics
providing for the issuance of a health certificate to every
bride and groom, the taxing of bachelors over 35 years of
age, the maintenance of a military for purposes of defense,
the discouragement of foreign trade as a breeder of wars
and internal habits of greed, the limiting of wealth to four
times the amount possessed by the average citizen, the un-
fitness of men engrossed in the pursuit of money to rule.
These are but a few of the suggestions of the great idealist,
2Durant, The Story of Philosophy (1927), p. 23.
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whose wisdom and theories have been criticized, but whose
insight into human nature has never been seriously ques-
tioned. The faith of Plato in the supremacy of the state to
the individual is his contribution to social thought.3
In spite of this program for the attainment of justice,
it was apparent then, as it is now, that the laws as applied
left much to be desired; and that chance and change ex-
acted their toll against society as a whole and the individual
as a unit. Then it was that Aristotle in his "Politics" be-
gan to examine the origins of chance and change. Applying
the inductive method, he undertook the criticism of some
158 Grecian institutions, exposing their limitations, and ex-
plaining the influences of climate, soil and physiography
on socety. His method was scientific while that of Plato
had been speculative. The background and investigations
of Aristotle made him a pronounced conservative. In speak--
ing of rapid-fire legislation, he exclaimed "the habit of
lightly changing the laws is an evil; and when the advan-
tage of change is small, some defects whether in the law or
in the ruler had better be met with philosophic toleration.
The citizen will gain less by the change, than he will lose
by acquiring the habit of disobedience." I It was the thought
of Aristotle that legal and political stability was substan-
'Ibid. at 19 et seq. Compare with the historical view as stated by James
C. Carter in his paper prepared at the request of the Committee of the Bar
Association of the City of New York and published in 1884 entitled, "The
Proposed Codification of Our Common Law." At p. 86 he says: "The point
now under notice can be summed up in a very narrow compass, and I cannot
help thinking that it is decisive of the whole question of codification.
"(1) It is agreed on all hands that private jurisprudence is a science;
whence it follows that it can be cultivated, developed and advanced only by
the masters of that science.
"(2) It is also agreed that a legislative body consisting principally of
laymen, possess no single qualification which enables it to prosecute the culti-
vation and improvement of this science, and its adaptation to human affairs.
"(3) The mode of effecting the improvement of private law and adapting
it to the ever-varying wants of men, which th recent advocates in England
of codification suggest, is the creation by the Legislature of a Committee
composed of eminent jurists, whose duty it shall be to observe the operation
of the -Code, and to report at intervals-say, of ten years-what improve-
ments, changes and additions should be made. But what comparison can such
a mode of amending, improving and adapting the law bear to that which is
now in actual operation, in which the whole machinery of administering jus-
tice, embracing, upon the Bench, tenfold the ability and learning Ni¢hich could
be arrayed upon a Committee, and all the ability of the Bar, is silently,
slowly, and without violent change, performing, as a subsidiary function, this
very task."
'Durant, The Story of Philosophy, ibid. at 91.
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tially dependent on the customs of the times and that "to
pass lightly from old laws to new ones is a certain means of
weakening the inmost essence of all law whatever." r How
advantageously might these words be emblazoned in the
corridors of our legislative buildings today. Although Aris-
totle did not have Plato's supreme confidence in the state,
he did not to any appreciable degree exalt the individual
and his rights.
The conquest of Alexander with its amalgamation of
the many and the different, required for the first time
the practical application of that idealistic conception-the
brotherhood of man. The general, similar moral conscious-
ness of the conqueror and the conquered which was observed
by the philosophers, unalterably lead to but one conclusion,
i. e., that the same resemblances and sympathies found in
different races, must have a common origin and that there
must be a theory capable of explaining them. The attempt-
ed explanation however, was reserved to the energy and
skill of later 'generations.
With the conquests of Alexander however, came Cos-
mopolitanism and says Franklin H. Giddings, "with Cosmo-
politanism, came individualism, and with it the final word
of Greek philosophy upon the social relations. Epicurean-
ism, with its emphasis upon individual initiative and indi-
vidual happiness, contended that the Society is best which
imposes minimum restraints upon the individual will. From
this doctrine as a premise, the conclusion was inevitably
reached that social and legal relations rest wholly upon in-
dividual self interest and the desire of each to secure him-
self against injury. * * * So the teaching of Plato and of
Aristotle was turned about. The assumption that Society
creates and moulds the individual became the dogma that
individuals for individualistic ends create society." 6
The march of time brought about the far reaching
Roman Empire with its assimilation of diverse ethnic groups,
which assimilation was not unaccompanied by conflicts of
mind and interest and finally adjustment to some extent
by law based on the common reason of the community. In
Ibid.
8 Giddings, Studies in the Theory of Human Society (1922), pp. 103, 104.
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the discussion of law the Greeks were largely speculative
and told us what the laws ought to be, whereas the practi-
cal Roman mind discussed the law as it then existed and
what caused it.
From the Greeks, to the Romans, from the Romans to
the Middle Ages, and from the Middle Ages to John Locke,
the contemplation and solution of the problems of society
had been predominantly speculative. Such statistics and
grouping of facts, as had been accomplished could hardly
be dignified with the name of science.
Speculation and idealism had 'practically saturated
human thought, when a complete turnabout was inaugurated,
resulting in the establishment of a Positivist Philosophy,
the science of precise observation, of which Auguste Comte
was the pre-eminent leader. His five volumes of Positive
Philosophy appeared between 1830 and 1842. Herein we
find the first systematic attempt to reduce the laws of
human relations to a science. It is in these volumes that
we find named the so-called new science, the science of
sociology. To Comte sociology was the crowning achieve-
ment of all science, for, as he reasoned, it would provide the
solutions for the most elusive of all known problems, human
society. It was apparent to Comte that science would solve
the riddle of society, and that the application of the scien-
tific method to human relations, would result in the accu-
rate determination of the laws which govern the habits and
actions of man as an individual and as a member of a
group. When these laws were discovered, understood and
applied, the pursuit and attainment of happiness in the
fullest sense would be unquestionably assured. An entranc-
ing hypothesis indeed, one which has engaged, since its pro-
nouncement, some of the most erudite scholars in the past
eighty years. The first and probably the best known of all
these men of learning was Herbert Spencer.
It is to Spencer that we accredit the first actual achieve-
ment in the science of Sociology. Setting as the ultimate
goal of society a liberty which is equalized by justice, he
deliberated on what was standing in the way of such a
Utopia. Was it conflict between groups? Was it militar-
ism? Was it industrialism? These and many other ques-
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tions which he raised, set the minds of men thinking in new
channels. But even Spencer, although he, at times, em-
ployed several clerks compiling human and social statistics,
did not consistently base his conclusions on this inductive
method. However, he is the first to have attempted the
systematic organization of social observations and the prog-
ress since made is largely attributed to the trail which he
blazed.
Since Spencer's day, the process of social researches
has gone on and on. Resultant conclusions have been far
from satisfactory; like everything new, sociology has borne
its share of criticism and downright ridicule. Being scien-
tific in method, it is no respecter of tradition. Some of its
hypotheses such as Behaviorism,7 which can be character-
ized as the control of conduct by environment alone are
difficult to accept; yet with all this, the effort to unravel the
mystery of human and social relations grips the imagina-
tion, and deserves the utmost consideration. Although so-
ciology may fall far short of its goal, the torch of science
which it bears must inevitably light up some of the recesses
which have been hitherto in darkness.
How has the law reacted to the sociologist and his in-
vestigations? Has it opposed him as the iconoclast of tra-
dition, or has it cautiously followed him, when convinced
of his theories? Is the law with its unalterable worship of
stare decisis impeding progress? Is the administration of
law today carried out in disregard of all the social theories
that have contributed to the better man and the better
group? Has there been any attempt to justify the existing
laws, by the scientific method? These are the questions
which lawyers must answer; these are the queries which
law teachers cannot lightly set aside. Let us examine, if
possible, what has been done and what remains to be done
in this direction.
Less than 100 years ago, the designation of law as a
social science was inconceivable. Investigators of the law
viewed it from an historical aspect only, studying the law
of the Romans and the law of their predecessors for the
sole purpose of better understanding the principles which
I Watson, Behaviorism (1924).
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they were then applying. Of course, the law had its critics,
but the criticism was directed against the misapplication
of the general principles, rather than against the principles
themselves.
At about the time when Spencer was writing, the courts
were applying the contract theory to their judicial deter-
minations. "All rights," it was thought, grew out of a legal
transaction, depending on the will of the parties. The con-
tract was the thing. The regulation of the public utility
was seriously hampered and needlessly delayed, because
as Roscoe Pound says, "The questions of public utility and
patron were treated as if they arose between two farmers
haggling over the sale of a horse." 8 Time and time again the
application of the contract theory impeded progress. Finally
social pressure prevailed and the theory of quasi contract
appeared, with its more equitable and social basis that under
some conditions an undeserved benefit required a compen-
sation. The present law is still quibbling on the strict con-
tract rule, in many of the recent decisions of our courts
of highest jurisdiction.9
s Quoted from a lecture entitled "Jurisprudence," delivered by Dean Pound
before the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the University of
Virginia, Research in the Social Sciences (1929), pp. 182, 183.
- See for example Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277
(1907), wherein Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, at 174, 175, 28
Sup. Ct. at 280, said: "The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms
as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of
labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from
the person offering to sell. * * * In all such particulars the employer and the
employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality
is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government
can legally justify in a free land."
And in Coppage v. United States 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1914),
at 14, 35 Sup. Ct. at 243, Mr. Justice Pitney stated: "Included in the right
of personal liberty and the right of private property-partaking of the nature
of each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief
among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and
other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this
right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial
impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional sense. The right
is as essential to the laborer as to the canitalist, to the poor as to the rich;
for the vast majority of persons have no- other honest way to begin to ac-
quire property, save by working for money."
And in Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U. S.
525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923), at 554, 43 Sup. Ct. at 400, Mr. Justice Sutherland
declared: "It is simply and exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to adult
women (for we are not now considering the provisions relating to minors),
who are legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men. It forbids
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The application of the contract theory of law furnished
no need for research. The parties had stated their respec-
tive wills and there was nothing left for the c Qurts to do
but enforce the promises. The social consequences of such
enforcement, except in rare instances as illegal contracts,
were no concern of the law.
The next advance in legal thought was originated by
the German philosopher, Hegel. To him the study of his-
tory would reveal the course of human progress, its ob-
stacles, the zeal for freedom of the will and the urge for
perfection. 10  Legal thinkers were quick to adopt this his-
torical method and with its adoption legal research was
born. The aim however, of legal research at this time was
not to change or improve the status quo but to throw fur-
ther light on the legal concepts of the day, especially the
concept of individualism.
two parties having lawful capacity-under penalties as to the employer-to
freely contract with one another in respect of the price for which one shall
render service to the other in a purely private employment where both are
willing, perhaps anxious, to agree, even though the consequence may be to
oblige one to surrender a desirable engagement and the other to dispense with
the services of a desirable employee."
10 Hegel. Philosophy of Right (translated by Dyde), sec. 100: "The injury
which the criminal experiences is inherently just because it expresses his own
inherent will, is a visible proof of his freedom and is his right. But more
than that, the injury is a right of the criminal himself, and is implied in his
realized will or act. In his act, the act of a rational being, is involved a uni-
versal element, which by the act is set up as a law. This law he has recog-
nized in his act, and has consented to be placed under it as under his right."
In the note to this section cited in Selected Readings in the Philosophy of
Law, compiled by Morris R. Cohen and Felix S. Cohen, the following com-
ment, not without interest, is made: "Note.-Beccaria, as is well known, had
denied to the state the right of exacting the death penalty, on the ground
that the social contract cannot be supposed to contain the consent of the in-
dividual to his own death; rather, as he thought, must the opposite be as-
sumed. To this it must be replied that the state is not a contract, nor, more-
over. are the protection and security of the life and property of individuals
in their capacity as separate persons, the unconditioned object of the state's
existence. On the contrary. the state is the higher existence, which lays claim
to the life and property of the individual, and demands the sacrifice of them.
"Not only has the conception of crime, the reasonable essence of it, to
be upheld by the state, with or without the consent of the individual, but
rationality on its formal side, the side of the individual will. is contained in
the act of the criminal. The criminal is honored as reasonable, because the
punishment is regarded as containing his own right. The honor would not be
shared by him, if the conception and measure of his punishment were not
deduced from his very act. Just as little is he honored when he is regarded
as a hurtful animal, which must be made harmless, or as one who must be
terrified or reformed. * * * Moreover, punishment is not the only embodiment
of justice in the state, nor is the .state merely the condition or possibility of
justice."
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With the introduction of psychology as an applied
science, the law began to lessen its respect for the abstract
individual. Legislation directed toward concrete justice for
the concrete man poured from our legislatures in the latter
part of the 19th century. For example, there were the acts
against payment of wages in orders on company stores,
about 1881, legislation as to conditions of labor, hours of
labor for women and children, child labor, loan shark laws,
workmen's compensation acts, blue sky laws and a host of
others which destroyed the concept of the contract by the
abstract individual. Notwithstanding the trend of the times,
practically all of these laws met opposition in our courts,
bent on tradition, until finally constitutional amendments
were frequently required to insure the concrete justice that
these laws demanded. 11
-u See the case of Earl Ives v. The South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271,
94 N. E. 431 (1911). In that case the court declared unconstitutional the
New York Workmen's Compensation Law. The following from the opinion
of the court is significant: "This legislation is challenged as void under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and under section 6, article
1 of our State Constitution, which guarantees all persons against deprivation
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. We shall not stop
to dwell at length upon definitions of 'life,' 'liberty,' 'property' and 'due process
of law.' They are simple and comprehensive in themselves and have been
so often judicially defined that there can be no misunderstanding as to their
meaning. Process of law in its broad sense means law in its regular course
of administration through courts of justice, and that is but another way of
saying that every man's right to life, liberty and property is to be disposed
of in accordance with those ancient and fundamental principles which were in
existence when our Constitutions were adopted. * * * One of the inalienable
rights of every citizen is to hold and enjoy his property until it is taken from
him by due process of law. When our Constitutions, were adopted it was the
law of the land that no man who was without fault or negligence could be
held liable in damages for injuries sustained by another. * * * The right of
property rests not upon philosophical or scientific speculations nor upon the
commendable impulses of benevolence or charity, nor yet upon the dictates
of natural justice. The right has its foundation in the fundamental law. That
can be changed by the people, but not by legislatures. In a government like
ours theories of public good or necessity are often so plausible or sound as
to command popular approval, but courts are not permitted to forget that
the law is the only chart by which the ship of state is to be guided. Law as
used in this sense means the basic law and not the very act of legislation
which deprives the citizen of his rights, privileges or property. Any other
view would lead to the absurdity that the Constitutions protect only those
rights which the legislatures do not take away. If such economic and so-
ciologic arguments as are here advanced in support of this statute can be
allowed to subvert the fundamental idea of property, then there is no private
right entirely safe, because there is no limitation upon the absolute discretion
of legislatures, and the guarantees of the Constitution are a mere waste of
words." Ultimately the Workmen's Compensation Law was introduced in New
York by constitutional amendment.
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The war between the abstract right of the individual
to contract versus concrete justice has been subsiding in
the last 30 years, but it cannot be conceded that concrete
justice has won a complete victory. The New York Rent
Law cases 12 represent one of the recent triumphs of con-
crete justice in the highest court in our land, but it will be
remembered that there was a strong dissent. The doctrine
that all men are created free and equal is now recognized
as being more theoretical than real.1 3  That some groups
are amenable to oppression looms up in the minds of the
jurist as worthwhile statistics supplant the catchwords of
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921) ; Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921).
"The point is well expressed by Pound in his frequently quoted article,
Liberty of Contract (1909), 18 Yale L. J. 454: "The effect of all system is
apt to be petrification of the subject systematized. Legal science is not ex-
empt from this tendency. Legal systems have their periods in which system
decays into technicality, in which a scientific jurisprudence becomes a me-
chanical jurisprudence. In a period of growth through juristic speculation
and judicial decision, there is little danger of this. But whenever such a
period has come to an end, when its work has been done and its legal theories
have come to maturity, jurisprudence tends to decay. Conceptions are fixed.
The premises are no longer to be examined. Everything is reduced to simple
deduction from them. Principles cease to have importance. The law becomes
a body of rules. This is the condition Professor Henderson refers to when
he speaks of the way of social progress as barred by barricades of dead prece-
dents. Manifestations of mechanical jurisprudence are conspicuous in the de-
cisions as to liberty of contract. A characteristic one is the rigorous logical
deduction from predetermined conceptions in disregard of and often in the
teeth of the actual facts, which was noted at the outset. Two courts, in pass-
ing on statutes abridging the power of free contract have noted the frequency
of such legislation in recent times, but have said that it was not necessary to
consider the reasons for it. Another court has asked what right the legis-
lature has to 'ass-zme that one class has the need of protection against another.'
Another has said that the remedy for the company store evil 'is in the hands
of the employee,' since he is not compelled to buy from the employer, forget-
ting that there may be a compulsion in fact where there is none in law. An-
other says that 'theoretically there is among our citizens no inferior class,'
and, of course, no facts can avail against that theory. Another tells us that
man and woman have the same rights, and hence a woman must be allowed
to contract to work as many hours a day as a man may. We have already
noted how Mr. Justice Harlan insists on a legal theory of equality of rights
in the latest pronouncement of the Federal Supreme Court. Legislation de-
signed to give laborers some measure of practical independence, which, if
allowed to operate, would put them in a position of reasonable equality with
their masters, is said by courts, because it infringes on a theoretical equality,
to be insulting to their manhood and degrading, to put them under guardian-
ship, to create a class of statutory laborers, and to stamp them as imbeciles.
I know of nothing akin to this artificial reasoning in jurisprudence unless
it be the explanation given by Pomponius for the transfer of legislative power
from the Roman peoole during the Empire: 'The "plebs" found, in course
of time, that it was difficult for them to meet together, and the general body
of the citizens, no doubt, found it more difficult still.' No doubt they did.
Caesar or the praetorian prefect would have seen to that. * * *"
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the French revolutionary and the generalities of the patriot
with an ax to grind. Legal sophistry, which ignores the
facts of the economic and social order, is gradually giving
way to the theory that law is telic and has a purpose which
is to advance civilization with maximum intelligence and
minimum restraint.1 4
" Compare, Ely, Property And Contract In Their Relation To The Dis-
tribution Of Wealth, vol. 11, c. 5: "In opposition to the individualistic the6ry
of contract, we place what we designate as the social theory of contract:
contract is establisled and maintained for social purposes. All contracts find
their logical origin in the social welfare and in this they find the grounds
for their maintenance. This theory of contract is analogous to the social
theory of property. We may say in fact it is substantially the same thing
if we take the view of American courts that the right to contract is a prop-
erty right.
"Contract finds its limitations in the social welfare, and as time goes on
less and less hesitation is felt in drawing the line beyond which contract
must not go. With increasing frequency our legislatures and our courts es-
tablish metes and bounds of contract. Story says in his work on Law of
Contracts:
'The rule of law, applicable to this class of cases, is, that all agreements
which contravene the public policy are void, whether they be in violation of
law or of morals, or tend to interfere with those artificial rules which are
supposed by the law to be beneficial to the interests of society, or obstruct the
prospective objects flowing indirectly from some positive legal injunction or
prohibition.'
"Nevertheless, on account of false ideas of freedom, courts are less ad-
vanced in recognizing the social theory of contract than in recognizing the
social theory of property. The ideas of the judges are more rigid when it
comes to the social control of contract. They allow the constitutionality of
laws which impose a real burden on property but at times set aside laws
which regulate contract as to hours of labor, the means of 'payments, etc.. as
shown elsewhere in the present work, although these laws impose slight
burdens and often in the end, when allowed, promote the welfare of all, em-
ployer, employee and society at large.
"The social control of contract has advanced so far in Australia that one
of the regular headings in the Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of
Australia is now 'Legislative Regulation of Wages and Terms of Contract,'
while the actual land legislation of Great Britain and Ireland for Scotland
and Ireland, and that now proposed for England as a cure for the evils of
tenancy, allows almost unlimited interference with private contract in order
to promote what is regarded as the general weal.
"The rapid progress even American courts are making in the recognition
of the social theory of contract is illustrated by their treatment of assumption
of risk as a defence where negligence is a breach of statutory duty. If a
statute imposes a duty to provide safety appliances and makes the employer
who fails to do so criminally liable, he cannot contract out of this liability.
But the chief point for the economist and the sociologist is that the courts
recognize that society has the dominant interest; and thus they work away
from that individualism which has done so much harm in the past. In con-
clusion it is not possible to do better than to quote from an excellent note
on this subject which appeared in a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review:
'If the right of the individual to recover involves only his personal in-
terest he may consent to give it up. But if society has an interest in the
right then the consent of the individual cannot destroy the right. Thus a house-
holder cannot waive his exemption because of the social interest that he and
his family be not reduced to poverty. An insurance company cannot waive
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If we concede that the law has a responsibility to civil-
ization, as well as to the individual will, the necessity of
scientific legal research follows. No longer can law be con-
sidered sui generis, but must rather be treated as a force
contributing to or detracting from the social weal, in pro-
portion to its adaptability or non-adaptability to the cul-
ture in which it finds itself. The legal science of today is
characterized by a functional attitude, an attitude of asking
what law does and how it does it, and how it may do better,
rather than asking what it is and how it came to be what
it is. Paramount among the methods of procuring adapta-
bility, is the accumulation of sound statistics for the use of
bench and bar and legislature. Had this method preceded
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, its future social
significance would surely have been more fully forecast.
There would be no need, perhaps, of a commission working
ten years after the passage of the Amendment, to determine
whether or not it should have been passed. Some of our most
progressive legislation including the recent amendments to
the decedent's estate law have been preceded by a thorough
investigation of the facts under the supervision of unbiased
experts.15
If we do not wish to lose the conceded benefits of the
present age, if we would perpetuate the high standard of
living for all, if we would correct the abuses which one
social group would heap upon another, even in this age,
our laws must be administered with a full recognition of
the complex problems which beset us. Our courts and legis-
a lack of insurable interest because of the danger to society in tempting the
beneficiary to destroy the life or chattel in which he has no interest. The
importance which the doctrine of assumption of risk acquired in the nine-
teenth century is an example of the individualistic theory of justice on which
the common law of that period proceeded, allowing each man to work out
his own salvation. But statutes prescribing criminal liability for failing to
guard machinery are enacted to protect the interest which society has that
its members be not maimed. The principal case, in overruling an earlier
New York decision construing the same statute, illustrates the increasing in-
clination of the courts today to recognize this interest of society. The em-
ployee's consent by an assumption of the risk to give up a right involving
such an interest should not' be effective whether such consent be worked out
contractually or otherwise.'"
"- Report of the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of Estates,
1928.
SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW
latures must know the facts, if they are to contribute to
social happiness. To compile the facts, to weigh them and
to classify them is the function of the legal scholar, not
working alone but in co-operation with all the scholars en-
gaged in the advancement of social science.1"
We live in an extremely practical era. Even her majesty,
the law, must submit to the test of usefulness. Let her not
be found wanting.
It has been urged that the sociologist errs in his first
hypothesis that the principles of behavior of groups and in-
dividual can be discovered by the method of investigation
employed in the natural sciences, that the methods which
led to the establishment of the law of gravitation cannot
yield the secret of the laws of human behavior; that the
difference between man and other physical matter is so
fundamental, that it is a waste of time to study him as we
would a chemical. As lawyers, we are ever solicitous of
the facts in any legal dispute, and justify seemingly in-
consistent conclusions, by unblushingly asserting that the
facts are different. Each adjudicated state of facts stands
as the rule for all subsequent cases on all fours, as we say.
Surely a factual investigation into any state of human af-
fairs ought not to meet with our disapproval, even though
we do not at the moment believe in the science of human
behavior. We are not, however, deluded into thinking that
when the sociologist achieves his ideal, if he ever does, that
perfection will be achieved, nor are we convinced that so-
ciology is necessarily the last of the sciences, as Comte would
have us believe. What we do know is that the social inves-
tigation has contributed to the twentieth century, if not
wholly, then in part, the more humane treatment of chil-
dren by parents and teachers, the transformation of the
child gang into the play group, the better understanding of
racial and religious differences, the children's court, the
parole system, and the means of assimilation of the foreign
"' See Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, p. 45: "Next to its func-
tional attitude this rejection of the conception of a wholly independent science
of law, drawn exclusively from the law itself and ignoring every other de-
partment of knowledge as irrelevant to its problems and of no value for its
ends, is the most significant feature of modern juristic thought."
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born. In most, if not in all of these movements, Sociology
has called upon the Law to assist it. Can the Law help,
if it does not understand?
EDWARD J. O'TooLE.
St. John's College School of Law.
